Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science features original essays on some of the most hotly debated issues in the field. Are there laws of social science? Are causes physically connected to their effects? Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?

Eight central questions shape the volume, with each question treated by a pair of opposing essays. This distinctive format offers readers a unique opportunity to observe philosophers engaging in head-to-head debate. Together, the essays provide an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary philosophy of science, including empiricism, confirmation, realism, laws, causation, and explanation.

Showcasing original arguments for well-defined positions, as well as clear and concise statements of sophisticated philosophical views, this volume is an excellent resource for professional philosophers and students alike.



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Belief in unobservables. The realist maintains that only the truth of our scientific theories can explain their great success ("no miracles"). Three alternative explanations are proposed. (1) A false theory may be successful because it is empirically equivalent to a true theory. Realist: this assumes that truth is manifested at the empirical level, which is the realist assumption. Antirealist: so what? This assumption is not enough to support the no miracles argument. (2) Present theories are successful because scientific theories are selected in a manner akin to evolution. Realist: this is not an alternative to the no miracles argument because it explains only why we have ended up with good theories, not what it is about these particular theories that make them successful. Antirealist: the explanation of their success is the manner in which they interact with empirical data, just as the explanation of the success of an organism is the manner in which it interacts with the environment (not its divine "perfection"). (3) The success of a theory is explained by the fact that the world behaves as if it this theory was true. Realist: this in hardly an explanation at all since it does not explain how, it does not explain the mechanism. Antirealist: It is a teleological explanation of sorts. Realists are rigging the debate in their favour by assuming that explanations which postulates the existence of entities is superior. (Cf. Newton vs. Cartesians on action at a distance.) An even stronger claim in this vein: the realist no miracles argument is circular since it assumes that explanatory virtues of hypotheses are reasons for believing them. This rule (inference to best explanation) is commonsensical and accepted by all in the empirical domain but why should we take its scope to extend to the domain of unobservables? Another antirealist challenge: to counter pessimistic induction from historical cases (e.g. Newton/Einstein) the realist needs a notion of approximate truth, which (in order to support the no miracles argument) must be strong enough to explain the success of science.

Modularity of mind. A priori arguments for modularity: evolution operates in (adaptive) increments; a general-purpose computer mind would be computationally intractable. Empirical arguments: human pathological evidence indicates that everything dissociates from everything else; children learn complex things very early despite poverty of stimulus. Example explained by desire-generating module but not general-purpose computer: high-status women want sons, low-status women want daughters, where high-status men do most of the breeding (humans, deer). The strongest objections attack the a priori arguments. It is not obvious that a general-purpose computer would be intractable once one considers it benefits in a variable environment and takes into account such things as the (possibly low) cost of mistakes. Complex behaviour requires some sort of metamodule so the modularists have not really solve the computability problem. They also assume a one-to-one relationship between function and module, i.e., that evolution "bolts on" new functions one by one to the existing repertoire. But evolution not only adds but also reforms drastically: feathers were developed for thermal regulation then used for flight; limbs for swimming, walking, flying. To assume that each module develops independently also ignores developmental entrenchment.

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